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152 CRIMINAL REPORTS 
WHEN TITANS CLASH: THE LIMITS OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION 
by 
Alan N. Young* 
A. Introduction 
44 C.R. (4th) 
The newspaper headline read: "Court rules against rape victims: 
Advocates shocked as judges give accused right to demand private 
counselling records." I Once again, members of the public are left with 
the impression that the Supreme Court of Canada has awarded the 
spoils of battle to the accused at the expense of sexual assault com-
plainants. In this comment, I hope to demonstrate two critical points. 
First, in f aimess to the court, it cannot be asserted that the court has 
afforded sexual assault victims less protection than other victims 
and/or witnesses who have legitimate expectations of informational 
privacy which they wish to assert as a shield to prevent public dis-
closure of this information in the context of a criminal trial. Second, 
despite the best intentions of the court, its proposed resolution of the 
~attle bet~een full an~wer. and defence and th~ complainant's privacy 
mterests 1s fraught with pitfalls an9- shortcommgs. Nothing short of 
legislative intervention can estabJish a meaningful and coherent 
framework for applications for production of sensitive/confidential 
material in the hands of third parties. 
There are limits to constitutional adjudication, and it is a mis-
guided and naive assumption to expect that the Supreme Court of 
Canada can successfully mediate the irreconcilable conflict between 
the rights of the accused and the rights of the victim. This conflict will 
never be resolved to the satisfaction of the opposing parties because 
the court has stipulated that there does not exist a hierarchy of rights in 
the Charter.2 In rejecting the "clash of titans" model of constitutional 
adjudication, the court has embarked upon an approach to competing 
*osgoode Hall Law School, North York, Ontario. 
1The [Toronto} Globe and Mail (December 15, 1995) l. 
2Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp., [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835, 34 C.R. (4th) 
269, 94 C.C.C. (3d) 289, 25 C.R.R. (2d) 1, 120 D.L.R. (4th) 12, 175 N.R. l, 76 
O.A.C. 81, at pp. 882-883 S.C.R.; R. v. Creighton, [1995] l S.C.R. 858, 37 C.R. 
(4th) 197, 179 XR. 161, 81 O.A.C. 359, (sub norn. R. v. Crawford) 96 C.C.C. (3d) 
481, 27 C.R.R. (2d) 1 [hereinafter "Crawford"]. 
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~o!1stitutional claims in whi~h a balancing exercise is conducted to 
give the fullest respect possible to the Charter values which underpin 
these [~ompetin~] ri~h~s."3 Given ~h~ inherently subjective nature of a 
balancmg e::cercise, .11 1s not surpr~smg that the opposing parties will 
nev~r be.s~tlsfied with a resu.lt which appears to be nothing more than 
a shght tlltmg of the balance m favour of one of the warring sides. 
B. The Battlefield 
In the last fiv~ years we have seen an ever-increasing defence 
strategy of ~equestmg production of psychiatric and therapeutic 
~ecords. relatmg to .. sexual assault complainants. Stripped of its 
ideological and poht1cal context, this phenomena is no different than 
the flurry of ?~eat~alyzer product~on requests which followed upon the 
Bourget dec1si?n m l ~87.4 Ultimately, the breathalyzer production 
strat~g~ faded mto obhvion as the courts imposed an "air of reality" 
re?tnct10n on the applications and indicated that they would not be in-
clmed to order stays of proceedings for failure to produce alcohol stan-
dard solutions, representative ampoules and breathalyzer 
mouthpieces. 5 
. . Unlike the br~athalyzer experience, the issue of producing sen-
s1t1v~ and c~nfidentlal r~~ords or complainants is animated by deeply 
held ~deolog1.c~l and po!1tical beliefs, and, as such, this issue would not 
fade .m!o obh".1on notwithstanding the "1ikely to be relevant" threshold 
r~stnction ~htch the courts p!aced upon these applications for produc-
t~on. ~n th1~ context, battle Imes appeared to be carved in stone with 
htt~e mcentive to adopt a compromise settlement. In fact, com-
P!amants and custodians of sensitive records have appeared willing to 
disregar~ court orders. Beyond the unprofessional conduct of the 
Crown m .R. v. O'Connor, repo~ed ante, p. 1, in failing to properly 
comply with an order of production, we have seen cases in which the 
records have been ~estroyed and shredded in an attempt to thwart the 
re9uest for production. To date, the courts have turned a blind eye to 
this extra-legal obstruction and have concluded that a stay of proceed-
3Crawford, ibid. at p. 882 S.C.R. 
4R. v. Bourget (1987), 56 C.R. (3d) 97, 46 M.V.R. 246, 54 Sask. R. 178, 35 
C.C.C. (3d) 371, 4 I D.L.R. (4th) 756, 29 C.R.R. 25 (C.A.) 
5See, for example, R. v. Eagles (1989), 68 C.R. (3d) 271, 11 M.V.R. (2d) 70, 88 
N_.S.R. (2d) 337, 225 A.P.R. 337, 47 C.C.C. (3d) 129, 41 C.R.R. 182 (C.A.); R. v. 
Timmons (1994), 132 N.S.R. (2d) 360, 376 A.P.R. 360 (C.A.); R. v. Anurooshkin 
(1994), 7 M.V.R. (3d) l 16, 92 C.C.C. (3d) 59, 47 B.C.A.C. 302, 76 W.A.C. 302. 
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ing is not warranted upon proof of an intent to obstruct but is only 
warranted if the obstruction truly impaired full answer and defence in 
a material way.6 
To understand the intensity of this battle one must recognize 
that, historically, sexual assault victims have been re-victimized by an 
insensitive and patriarchal criminal justice system. Fueled by Freud's 
assertion that women and children are hysterical by nature, we find 
countless examples of statutory and common law evidentiary rules 
which treated the evidence of sexual assault victims with great 
suspicion and skepticism. In Wigmore's Treatise on Evidence, the 
eminent commentator noted that "no judge should ever let a sexual 
offence charge go to the jury unless the female complainant's social 
history and mental makeup have been examined and testified to by a 
qualified physician."7 
The ghosts of the past still haunt the criminal jll'.;tice system, 
and, as Madam Justice L'Heureux-Dube noted, "uninhibited dis-
closure of complainants' private lives indulges the discriminatory 
suspicion that women and children's reports of sexual victimization 
are uniquely likely to be fabricated."8 Therefore, it is not surprising 
that complainants and custodians of sensitive records would view al-
most all production requests as a form of character assassination 
which is premised upon the dangerous Freudian and Wigmorian 
stereotype of half the population being prone to fabrication. 
On the other hand, we have a defence lawyer poised for battle 
because his/her client has denied the accusation. In most cases of 
sexual assault, there is an absence of confirmatory evidence and inde-
pendent witnesses, and this raises the spectre of false accusations. 
This fear of false accusation is somewhat supported by a recent study 
by the Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics which revealed that the 
"unfounded"9 rate for sexual assault was 14 per cent, 9 per cent and 14 
per cent for sexual assault level I (s. 271), level II (s. 272) and level III 
(s. 273) respectively. These figures were compared to the unfounded 
rate for non-sexual assault which varied from 8 per cent with respect 
6R. v. Carosella (1995), 102 C.C.C. (3d) 28, 85 O.A.C. 297 (C.A.); R. v. L. (P.S.) 
(November 23, 1995), Doc. CAOl 9674 (B.C. C.A.), [1996] B.C.W.L.D. 027. 
1Wigmore on Evidence, vol. 3A (Chadbourn rev.) (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 
1970), § 924. 
8R. v. O'Connor, ante, at p. 59. 
9"Unfounded" does not necessarily mean frivolous or false. It is defined as 
follows: "if the preliminary enquiry conducted by the police reveals that a reported 
crime has not been committed, this incident is to be classified as unfounded." 
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to assault level I (s. 266) to 3 per cent with respect to assault level II 
and III (ss. 267 and 268). JO Furthermore, a recent study by an 
American sociologist demonstrated that 40 per cent of all rape charges 
investigated by city police turned out to be false as determined bi 
recantation by the accuser and supported by other evidence. 1 
Although it is conceded that further study must be given in order to 
explain this high unfounded rate, it is not surprising that defence coun-
sel will search for whatever effective tools may be available to fully 
explore an accusation of sexual assault in order to ensure that his or 
her client is not in the category of the unfounded complaint. 
There are other offences which have higher unfounded rates 
than sexual assault (arson - 23.8 per cent; trespass at night - 14.3 per 
cent; abduction of person under 14 - 42.3 per cent), 12 yet we do not 
see the mad rush to impeach the credibility of Crown witnesses in 
these cases by resort to psychiatric and therapeutic records. This ap-
parent inconsistency in defence strategy may suggest that defence 
lawyers still cling to and believe in the Wigmorian assessment of 
sexual assault complainants. However, it is equally plausible that the 
reliance on production requests in sexual assault trials is more a reflec-
tion of the nature of these trials, which tum largely on credibility 
battles without the luxury of independent evidence of a confirmatory 
nature. Regardless of which explanation is correct, it is apparent that 
both sides to this battle view the other with much suspicion and some 
disdain. 
C. The Treaty of O'Connor 
Briefly summarized, future battles over sensitive records in the 
possession of third parties will be subject to the following regime: 
1) These guidelines apply to any record, in the hands of a third 
party, in which a reasonable expectation of privacy lies. 
2) If the records are already in the possession of the Crown, then 
there is no reasonable expectation of privacy and the rule in 
10Juristat, Canadian Justice Processing of Sexual Assault Cases (Ottawa: Centre 
for Justice Statistics, March 1994), vol. 14, no. 7 at p. JO. 
11 E. Kanin, False Rape Accusations ( 1994) Archives of Sexual Behavior (New 
York: Plenum Press, 1994), at pp. 81-92. 
12Statistics Canada, Canadian Crime Statistics 1993 (Ottawa: Centre for Justice 
Statistics, 1993 ). 
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Stinchcombe 13 applies (i.e., Crown may withhold disclosure if it 
can show that the records are clearlv irrelevant or subject to 
privilege). • 
3) Sexual assault counselling records are not subject to an ab-
solute class privilege, and the applicability of privilege will be 
decided on a case-by-case basis in accordance with the fourfold 
criteria articulated by Wigmore and adopted in Slavutych v. 
Baker. 14 
4) In order to obtain production, the accused must bring a for-
mal written application and notice must be given to all affected 
parties. This initial application should be made to the trial judge 
seized of the trial. 
5) The materials will be produced to the trial judg0 for inspec-
tion if the accused satisfies the judge that the information is 
!ikely to be relevant. This threshold requirement of demonstrat-
mg relevance may be defined as a reasonable possibility that the 
information is logically probative to an issue at trial or the com-
petence of a witness to testify. This burden of persuasion should 
not be viewed as an "onerous" burden and it is simply a require-
ment to prevent speculative, fishing expeditions. 
6~ If.this threshold i.s met, then the records are produced to the 
tnal Judge to determme whether, and to what extent, they should 
be produced to the accused. At this stage, the reviewing judge 
must balance the ability of the accused to make ful1 answer and 
de.fence against the prejudice to the complainant's dignity and 
pnvacy. 
7) If the records are not produced to the accused, then the ac-
C?s~d can only review this decision upon an appeal from con-
viction. If the records are ordered produced, the complainant 
and/or the custodian of records may immediately seek review by 
the Supreme Court of Canada pursuant to s. 40 of the Supreme 
Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26. 
13R. v. Stinchcombe, [199113 S.C.R. 326, 8 C.R. (4th) 277, f 19921 I W.W.R. 97, 
83 Alta. LR. (2d) 193, 68 C.C.C. (3d) 1, 130 N.R. 277, 120 A.R. 161, 8 W.A.C. 
161, 18 C.R.R. (2d) 210. 
14[1976J 1 S.C.R. 254, 38 C.R.N.S. 306, [1975] 4 W.W.R. 620, 75 C.LL.C. 
14,263, 55 D.L.R. (3d) 224. 
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The minority position in the court is not altogether different 
from the majority position, except that the threshold requirement is 
more rigorous and challenging for the accused. The minority tilts the 
balance in favour of non-production because they view the vast 
majority of these applications as frivolous or even abusive. By con-
trast, the majority clearly adopts a different perspective and notes that 
they "disagree with L'Heureux-Dube J.'s assertion that therapeutic 
records will only be relevant to the defence in rare cases." l 5 
D. The Level Playing Field 
Although an absolute bar of production would best serve the 
privacy interests of complainants, it is clear that the compromise 
reached by the court parallels the approach adopted with respect to 
production of confidential information in contexts other than sexual 
assault prosecutions. In addition, the compromise reached by the 
court reflects the experience of other jurisdictions in this controversial 
area of law. As a result, the O'Connor decision creates a level playing 
field in which all complainants and witnesses who wish to withhold 
information from the courts are treated in a similar fashion. 
The right to full answer and defence is considered fundamental 
and primary and it has been noted by the court that "the right to a fair 
trial is fundamental and cannot be sacrificed.'' 16 In order to achieve 
full answer and defence, the accused is entitled to the most extensive 
and probing cross-examination as· is consistent with the rules of 
evidence. Every opportunity must be given to the accused to expose 
the frailties of Crown witnesses, and this opportunity to impeach goes 
far beyond the restriction imposed with respect to the cross-
examination of an accused person. As the Supreme Court has noted: 
I think it essential to stress the purpose for which the cross-
examination is pennitted, namely, in order that the defence may ex-
plore ... the frailty of the evidence called by the prosecution. That 
the accused as he stands in the prisoner's box on trial for murder is 
?eemed to be innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt 
is one of the fundamental presumptions inherent in the common law 
and as such the accused is entitled to employ every legitimate means 
of testing the evidence called by the Crown to negative that presump-
tion and in my opinion this indudes the right to explore all cir-
cumstances capable of indicating that any of the prosectJtion 
150 'Connor, ante, decision of Chief Justice Lamer and Justice Sopinka at p. 25. 
16Dagenais, supra, note 2 at p. 949 S.C.R.; R. v. Seaboyer, [ 1991] 2 S.C.R. 577, 7 
C.R. (4th) 117, 128 N.R. 81, 6 C.R.R. (2d) 35, 66 C.C.C. (3d) 321, 83 D.L.R. (4th) 
193, 48 O.A.C. 8 I, at p. 607 S.C.R. 
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witnesses had a motive for favouring the Crown. 17 
Further, "medical evidence is admissible to show that a witness 
suffers from some disease or defect or abnormality of the mind, that 
effects [sic] the reliabiJity of his or her evidence." 18 Psychiatric 
evidence, indicating that the testimony of a witness may be manifestly 
unreliable, is admissible with respect to both the issue of witness' 
competence to testify and with respect to the issue of the credibility of 
the witness.19 The following principles appear to have emerged with 
respect to the admission of psychiatric evidence to impeach the com-
petence or credibility of a Crown witness: 
1) It is irrelevant whether the evidence is characterized as going 
to credibility or competence, and the only relevant question for 
the trial judge is "whether the light which might be shed by the 
expert is or is not essential, necessary, useful or superfluous";20 
2) Expert evidence may not be necessary if the reliability 
problems are disclosed by means other than a psychiatric 
assessment;21 
3) The defence is entitled to request that the 
witness/complainant undergo a psychiatric assessment if he/she 
is willing to do so and the Ci;own cannot act to thwart this re-
quest as there is no property in a witness;22 
17R. v. Titus, Ll983] 1 S.C.R. 259, 33 C.R. (3d) 17, 2 C.C.C. (3d) 321, 144 
DL.R. (3d) 577, 46 N.R. 477, at pp. 263-264 S.C.R. 
18R. v. Desmoulin (1976), 30 C.C.C. (2d) 517 (Ont. C.A.), at p. 522. 
19Toohey v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner, [1965] A.C. 595, 49 Cr. App. 
R. 148, [1965] l All E.R. 506 (H.L.). 
20R. v. Julien (1980), 57 C.C.C. (2d) 462 (Que. C.A.), at p. 477. 
21 R. v. French (1977), 37 C.C.C. (2d) 201 (Ont. C.A.), at p. 212 (lack of 
reliability disclosed in cross-examination); R. v. Hedstrom (1991 ), 63 C.C.C. (3d) 
261 (B.C. C.A.) (problems with complainant's mental capacity disclosed by 
complainant's own admission) R. 1·. Nickerson (1993), 21 C.R. (4th) 262, 81 C.C.C. 
(3d) 398, 121 N.S.R. (2d) 314, 335 A.P.R. 314 (C.A.) (trial judge was made aware 
that victim was mentally handicapped). 
22French, ibid. at p. 213. It should be noted that in R. v. Olscamp ( 1994), 30 C.R. 
(4th) 106, 91 C.C.C. (3d) 180 (Ont. Gen. Div.) the court dismissed an application to 
order the complainant to undergo a psychiatric assessment. 
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4) It is not necessary for the expert to have examined the com-
plainant and he/she can P,rovide an expert opinion on the basis 
of hypothetical questions. 23 
Therefore, there is a juridical basis for seeking therapeutic 
records for impeachment purposes; however, a claim of privilege 
could defeat this impeachment strategy. Over the years, the Supreme 
Court of Canada has expressed a reluctance to expand the categories 
of "class privilege" in recognition that claims of privilege operate to 
thwart the truth-seeking function of a trial. 24 There was little surprise 
when the court declined to extend a class privilege to therapeutic 
records in the case at bar. \Vhether the complainant's interest is 
characterized as an evidentiary privilege or a constitutional right to 
privacy, all roads lead to the fourth factor of Wigmore's fourfold 
criteria for determining whether to protect confidential communica-
tions: whether "The injury that would inure to the relation by the dis-
closure of the communications must be greater than the benefit 
thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation."25 In other words, 
a claim of privilege or confidentiality will be upheld only if it does not 
substantially impair the fairness of the trial. 
In A. (L.L.) v. B. (A.), reported ante, p. 91, L'Heureux-Dube J. 
carefully examines case law dealing with privilege and confidential in-
formation, outside of the context of sexual assault prosecutions, in-
cluding that relating to police informants, solicitor-client privilege, 
and Cabinet privilege. The courts have consistently ordered produc-
tion if there is a real possibility that the documents will assist in the 
establishment of innocence. The cases do not generally impose a 
stringent threshold requirement on the accused, and in most cases the 
court will undertake an inspection of the document to determine its 
materiality for the defence. 
On a comparative front, we can also see that the Supreme 
Court's resolution of the production issue is consistent with the ap-
23R. v. Wald, 68 C.R. (3d) 289, 65 Alta. L.R. (2d) 114, [1989] 3 W.W.R. 324, 94 
A.R. 125, 47 C.C.C. (3d) 315 (Alta. C.A.), at pp. 350-351 C.C.C., p. 325 C.R. 
24R. v. Fosty, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 263, 8 C.R. (4th) 368, [1991) 6 W.W.R. 673, 130 
N.R. I 61, 75 Man. R. (2d) 112, 6 W.A.C. I 12, 7 C.R.R. (2d) l 08, (sub nom. R. v. 
Gruenke) 67 C.C.C. (3d) 289, at p. 296 S.C.R. See also R. v. S. (R.J.) ( 1985), 45 
C.R. (3d) 161, I 9 C.C.C. (3d) 115, 8 O.A.C. 241 (C.A.), at p. 129 C.C.C., 
pp. 176-177 C.R.; Kelly v. R. (1994), 32 C.R. (4th) 121, (sub nom. Kel(v v. Canada) 
79 F.T.R. 186, at pp. 123-124 C.R. 
25Wigmore on Evidence, vol. 8 (McNaughton rev.) (Boston: Little, Brown & 
Co., 196 I), § 2285. 
160 CRIMINAL REPORTS 44 C.R. (4th) 
proach adopted in other jurisdictions. The United States Supreme 
Court has had one occasion to deal with the issue of production of 
confidential records in the possession of a third party. In that case, rhe 
accused argued that he should be entitled to child welfare files 
"because the file might contain the names of favourable witnesses, as 
well as other, unspecified exculpatory material." Despite the bald 
generality of the request, the court held that the accused was entitled to 
an in camera review of the material by the trial judge. The court 
stated: 
At this stage, of course, it is impossible to say whether any infor-
mation in the CYS records may be relevant to Ritchie's claim of 
innocence, because neither the prosecutor nor defence counsel has 
seen the information, and the trial judge acknowledged that he had 
not reviewed the full file ... Although we recognize that the public 
interest in protecting this type of information is strong, we do not 
agree that this interest necessarily prevents disclosure in all 
circumstance .... 
We find that Ritchie's interest (as well as the Commonwealth) in 
ensuring a fair trial can be protected fully by requiring the CYS files 
be submitted only to the trial judge for in camera review. Although 
this rule denied Ritchie the benefits of an "advocate's eye", we note 
that the trial court's discretion is not unbounded. If a defendant is 
aware of specific material contained in the file ... he is free to re-
quest it directly from the court, and ~gue in favor of its materiality. 26 
Most American courts have ruled that requests for production 
should be dealt with on a case-by-case basis while avoiding rigid, for-
malistic rules for resolution of this issue. In addition, the courts have 
held that upon judicial in camera inspection, once the court determines 
that some material may assist the defence, the judge must provide 
counsel with access to the material and not simply provide a summary 
of the gist of the helpful material. 27 
Many courts do not require the demonstration of a threshold re-
quirement of need and materiality before undertaking judicial inspec-
tion. Often, the relevant test is simply that inspection is left to the 
"sound discretion" of the reviewing judge. The courts have tilted the 
balance in favour of automatic inspection for two reasons: first, in-
spection permits a far more informed resolution of the issue of 
whether the records contain material information, and, second, produc-
26Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 107 S.Ct. 989 at 1001-1003 (1987). 
27 State v. Storlazzi, 464 A.2d 829 at 833 (Conn. I 983); United States v. 
Lindstrom, 698 F.2d 1154 at 1165-1 I 67 (1983); State v. Harris, 631 A.2d 309 at 
317-318 (Conn. 1993). 
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ing the records for inspection creates a record which allows for more 
meaningful appellate review. 28 Some courts have tilted the balance 
even further in favour of the accused's right to full answer and defence 
by requiring that the in camera review be conducted in the presence of 
counsel, with counsel being provided access to the materials in order 
to make meaningful submissions.29 
Inspection ?f confident~al, therapeutic records is constitutionally 
~andated. Even m states wh1ch have passed Victims' Bills of Rights, 
It ?as been ~e~d that statutory ri~hts ~ranted to victims (e.g., in 
Anzona the v1ct1m can refose to be mterv1ewed by the defence) cannot 
override constitutional requirements of due process.30 
. Alth?.ugh mai:iy co~rt~.simply leave the issue of judicial inspec-
tlon to the sound d1scret1on of the court, there are other courts which 
require a particularized showing of need prior to having the judge em-
bark upon the in camera screening. Different formulations abound; 
h?wever, the thres~old requirement appears to be set fairly low. The 
different formulations of the threshold are: "particular need to 
discover"; "particularized factual showing in support of assertion that 
access" is needed; "reason to believe that [it] would provide a ·source 
of impeachment material"; "preliminary showing that there is reason-
able ground to believe that the failure to produce the record would 
likely impair his right to impeach the witness"; "records are likely to 
contain material relevant to the defence."31 
Finally: deference to the legislature is the accepted practice 
when t~e leg1.slatl:1re has respond~d to this difficult issue by passing 
protective leg1slat1on. The courts approach to production in the face 
of legislation is threefold: (1) if a statutory privilege is created for 
certain therapeutic relationships, the court will still engage in balanc-
ing if the statutory privilege contains some exceptions; (2) if the 
statutory privilege is absolute then the material is not subject to dis-
closure under any circumstances; (3) if the privilege is merely recog-
28United States v. Phillips, 854 F.2d 273 at 277-278 (1988); Hulett i·. State, 552 
N.E.2d 47 at 49-50 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990). 
29?.aal v. State, 602 A.2d 1247 at 1262-1263 (Md. App. 1992); rommonweafth 
v. Stockhammer, 570 N.E.2d 992 at I 002 (Mass. 1991 ); Commonwealth I". Lloyd, 
567 A.2d 1357 (Pa. I 989). 
30State ex. rel. Romley v. Superior Court, 836 P.2d 445 at 451-454 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 1992); State v. Kalakosky, 852 P.2d 1064 at 1075-!076 (Wash. 1993). 
31 State v. Vincent, 591 A.2d 65 at 68 (Vt. 1991); People v. District Court, 719 
P.2d 722 at 727 (Colo. 1986); People v. Foggy, 521 N.E.2d 86 at 92 (Ill. 1988); 
State v. Joyner, A.2d 791 at 806 (Conn. 1993); Kalakosky, supra, note 37 at 1077. 
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nized at common law, then disclosure is the norm and defence access 
to the records for the purpose of showing materiality is the accepted 
practice. 3Z 
Surprisingly, Commonwealth jurisdictions, other than Canada, 
have had little or no experience regarding production requests for 
therapeutic records. However, in the generic area of "public interest 
immunity" the Commonwealth courts have ordered production of sen-
sitive information if the accused has shown "good reason" for the 
request. 33 Furthermore, these courts have a~cepted that production for 
inspection by the judge may be necessary to determine if there is a 
"good reason" to order production. 34 Similar to the Supreme Court of 
Canada's formulation, the courts have articulated the fol1owing defini-
tion of "materiality" as the pre-condition for production to the 
defence: 
"I would judge to be material in the realm of disclosure that which 
can be seen on a sensible appraisal by the prosecution: 
(1) to be relevant or possibly relevant to an issue in the case; 
(2) to raise or possibly raise a new issue whose existence is not 
apparent from the evidence the prosecution proposes to use; 
(3) to hold out a real (as opposed to fanciful) prospect of providing a 
lead on evidence which goes to ( 1) or (2).35 
Non-disclosure on the basis of "sensitive" or "private delicacy 
to the maker" is considered an insignificant ground upon which to 
deny disclosure. "Such trivial grounds could not possibly support a 
legal objection to the production of documents which are relevant and 
32Commonwealth v. Eck, 605 A.2d 1248 at 1252-1253 (Pa. 1992); 
Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 604 A.2d 1036 at 1044-1047 (Pa. 1992); 
Commonwealth v. Kyle, 533 A.2d 120 at 125-131(Pa.1987). 
33 R. v. Hennessey and Others (1978), 68 Cr. App. R. 419 (C.A.), at pp. 425-426; 
R. v. Agar (1989), 90 Cr. App. R. 318 (C.A.), at p. 324; R. v. Turner, [1995] I 
W.L.R. 264, [1995] 2 Cr. App. R. 94, [1995] 3 All E.R. 432 (C.A.). 
34R. v. Brown, [1994] I W.L.R. 1599 (C.A.), at pp. 1607-1608; R. v. K (TD.) 
(1993), 97 Cr. App. R. 343 (C.A.), at p. 346; Alister v. R. (1984), 154 C.L.R. 404, 
58 A.L.J.R. 97, 51A.L.R.480, 50 A.LR. 41 (Aust. H.C.), at pp. 456-457 C.L.R 
35R. v. Keane, (1994] l W.L.R. 746, 99 Cr. App. R. I, (1994] 2 All E.R. 478 
(C.A.) at p. 6 Cr. App. R.; R. v. Brown, ibid. at p. 1606. 
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may exculpate a defendant."36 
In conclusion, it can be seen that the Supreme Court's resolution 
of the battle between full answer and defence and the complainant's 
right to privacy is consistent with principles and rules articulated in 
other contexts and in other jurisdictions. In fact, the court's approach 
is arguably more restrictive on full answer and defence than is the ap-
proach in these other contexts and jurisdictions. Therefore, it may be 
unfair to accuse the court of unjustifiably siding with the accused in 
this controversy, unless one is prepared to argue that the approach of 
virtually every coun in all English-speaking jurisdictions, with respect 
to the production of confidential and private materia:, is misguided 
and insensitive. 
E. The Need for Legislative Intervention 
The court's proposal is doomed to fail for two reasons. First, 
the court does not adequately address the "Catch-22" of requiring the 
accused to establish "likely relevance" for documents which he/she 
has never seen. Thus, the proposed procedure cannot serve to prevent 
miscarriages of justice in all cases. Second, judicial inspection for 
materiality (i.e., to determine whether to produce the information to 
the defence) is less than satisfactory because the judge cannot perform 
the role of defence counsel (i.e., exercise the "advocate's eye") while 
exercising his/her judicial function. As the Manitoba Court of Appeal 
has noted in another context: 
The reason why defence counsel must be allowed a full opportunity 
in that regard [i.e. cross-examination] is that he has the best oppor-
tunity of knowing what is the best defence for his client and what 
type of questions in cross-examination will be most effective to that 
end. He has an advantage denied to the trial judge the advantage of 
knowing the position taken by the defendant, the evidence he will 
adduce in support of that position, and the evidence opposed to it 
which he must render as ineffective as possible. 37 
From the point of view of the complainant and the custodian of 
records, the proposed resolution is also fraught with difficulties. First, 
if the complainant is ordered to produce material, he/she must under-
take a costly appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada with no 
36Brown, ibid. 
37R. v. /gnat (1965), 53 W.W.R. 248 (Man. C.A.), at p. 250. also,/?. v. 
Brouillard, [1985) I S.C.R. 39, (sub nom. Brouillard (Chatel) c. R.) 44 C.R. (3d) 
124, [1985] RD.J. 38, 17 C.C.C. (3d) 193, 16 D.L.R. (4th) 447, 57 N.R. 168, at 
p. 43 S.C.R. 
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guarantee that the trial judge will stay proceedings pending a review of 
the order of production. Second, in light of the intrusiveness of a 
production order, there should be statutory rules respecting: (a) 
protective mechanisms to minimize the intrusion; (b) sanctions for 
breach of confidence; and (c) clear procedures for a prompt resolution 
of the application. As it stands, the court contemplates applications 
being made to the trial judge, and this can only serve to occasion 
delay.38 In some cases, the requested material (often handwritten) 
may fill countless boxes, and it is unrealistic to assume that the 
production request can be expeditiously resolved on the eve of trial. 
Constitutional adjudication works well for remedying past injus-
tices and violations of constitutional rights. The traditional adversarial 
process does not work as well when it comes to fashioning rules to 
operate in a prospective fashion. The need for legislative intervention 
is clear because only a consultative process can serve to effectively 
address some of the following issues: 
1) To what extent will production orders negatively impact on 
the therapeutic process and on the reporting of sexual assault? 
2) Should absolute statutory privileges be created for certain 
types of therapeutic records? If so, should there be a statutory 
duty imposed on the custodian of records to disclose any infor-
mation which casts serious doubt on the truthfulness of the ac-
cusation? 
3) Should a special administrative tribunal be established to en-
tertain claims for production? Should the decision of the 
tribunal be reviewable? Should time-limits be placed upon 
production claims to ensure that the issue is finally resolved 
prior to trial? 
4) In the event of production, what protective measures should 
be in place to minimize the intrusion upon privacy? 
Finally, it must be recognized that tinkering with evidentiary 
and procedural rules cannot effectively serve to ease the plight of rape 
victims and prevent re-victimization by the process. We must not rely 
exclusively on the judicial process to assist victims, as this process is 
38In fact, Madam Justice L'Heureux-Dube held that the preliminary hearing is not 
a proper forum for production requests. It is unclear if the majority agree with this 
proposition, and it is directly contrary to a recent decision of the Ontario Court of 
Appeal in R. v. R. (L.) (1995), 39 C.R. (4th) 390, 28 C.R.R. (2d) 173, JOO C.C.C. 
(3d) 329, 127 D.L.R. (4th) 170. 
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structured and designed to facilitate full answer and defence and is, 
accordingly, weighted in favour of the rights of the accused. Although 
fiscal constraints are a reality, it is incumbent upon both the federal 
and provincial governments to provide meaningful assistance through 
properly-funded shelters and counselling services. 
Criminal trials will always be emotionally-jarring and painful 
experiences, and there is only so much a court can do to make the 
process as painless as possible for victims. The Supreme Court of 
Canada should not be forced into the position of being the only institu-
tion with a mandate to protect the interests of victims. The com-
promise resolution reached by the court with respect to this issue of 
production of confidential records underscores the need to start look-
ing for meaningful victim assistance to be provided outside the 
courtroom. One cannot expect that evidentiary and procedural rules 
can serve both the accused's interest in full answer and defence and 
the victim's right to privacy and dignity. Although a court can resolve 
individual battles, it can do little to bring the war to an end. 
***** 
